Thursday, July 15, 2004
Free Trade Agreement
In this wonderfully 'globalized' world, we must all learn to sell dear and buy cheap, no matter what the effects on any one community. Australia started to negotiate a 'Free Trade Agreement ' with Big Brother America, part of which involved the sacrifice on the altar of free enterprise' of our 'naughty' Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, part of the even more 'evil' Australian system of socialized medicine
So, Australian Trade Minister, Mark Vaile, has finally admitted that the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme is ‘on the table’ when it comes to negotiating a Free Trade Agreement. Gee whiz, eh?
Unlike Howard’s ‘aspirational voters,’ we on the Loony Left have always known that it would be — and we’ve been prepared to say so, in spite of the cacophonous screeching of the Coalition’s media lackeys. After all, US drug companies gave far more to Dubya’s Millennial election campaign than did the oil companies — and, as former Liberal luminary, Malcolm Fraser often reminded us, “people who take risks with money [even other peoples’] expect to be rewarded.”
We often hear that “Australians are comfortable with the US alliance.” This may well be true — we in Oz know that the best way to escape the attentions of a cabal of bullies is to hire the Biggest Bully on the Block —but I wonder how ‘comfortable’ we’ll be when we’re forced to pay two to four times the Recommended Retail Price for our medications!
So, Australian Trade Minister, Mark Vaile, has finally admitted that the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme is ‘on the table’ when it comes to negotiating a Free Trade Agreement. Gee whiz, eh?
Unlike Howard’s ‘aspirational voters,’ we on the Loony Left have always known that it would be — and we’ve been prepared to say so, in spite of the cacophonous screeching of the Coalition’s media lackeys. After all, US drug companies gave far more to Dubya’s Millennial election campaign than did the oil companies — and, as former Liberal luminary, Malcolm Fraser often reminded us, “people who take risks with money [even other peoples’] expect to be rewarded.”
We often hear that “Australians are comfortable with the US alliance.” This may well be true — we in Oz know that the best way to escape the attentions of a cabal of bullies is to hire the Biggest Bully on the Block —but I wonder how ‘comfortable’ we’ll be when we’re forced to pay two to four times the Recommended Retail Price for our medications!
ANZUS Treaty out of Time
Editorial Leader - The Canberra Times
Monday, 14 June 2004
A T BARELY 800 words, the ANZUS treaty is hardly a testament to black-letter law. Ratified in 1951, the treaty binds the signatories to recognise that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of them would endanger the peace and safety of the others. It commits them to consult in the event of a threat and, in the event of attack, to meet the common danger in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. Concluded in the shadow of the Korean War, the treaty offered Australian and New Zealand a protection against a possible future threat of Soviet or Chinese aggression. For the US, the pay-off was a secure stake in the Pacific as it sought to strengthen its alliances around the world to contain communism.
The domino theory of communist encroachment might have been consigned to the scrap heap years ago, replaced by a fundamentally changed geopolitical climate, but the alliance continues in all its nebulousness, thanks mainly to the belief of Australian Governments — of both political persuasions — that it is fundamental to national security. While in opposition, the ALP has occasionally questioned aspects of the alliance, but has generally fallen into a supportive line once in government. For the Americans, of course, the alliance is but a minor aspect of its global security considerations, though it has proved useful on occasion (such as the Vietnam and Gulf Wars) for Administrations looking for willing partners to lend their strategic ambitions with a veneer of respectability.
Unusually, ANZUS is of particularly concern of the Administration of George W Bush right now, struggling as it is to maintain the legitimacy of its invasion of Iraq. For Mr Bush, mindful of the potential damage Iraq represents to his chances of re-election in November, having Australian forces on the ground, however small that actual presence, is symbolically important. Hence the chorus of disapproval, beginning first with Mr Bush's own comments earlier this month, of Mark Latham's stated intention of withdrawing Australian troops from Iraq should he win the next election. That these criticisms have become increasingly strident and blunt, as evidenced by the comments of Deputy of State Richard Armitage late last week, indicates the political vulnerability of the Administration, and to a certain extent its willingness to help out Prime Minister John Howard, also in political hot water over his backing of the US-led invasion.
What seemed like a politically astute move at the time by Latham to distance the ALP from the Coalition's enthusiastic backing of the Iraqi invasion now looks to have gone awry. He was probably unwise to commit to bringing home all the troops when leaving a small contingent might have left him room to manoeuvre. Certainly, last Friday's admission that the ALP will now take advice from Foreign Affairs Department security experts on what needs to be done to protect Australia's diplomats indicates Mr Latham has had second thoughts about maintaining a presence that will satisfy American demands for solidarity. A mandate from the UN for the presence of foreign troops in Iraq, which is now looking like a distinct possibility, might save Mr Latham the political embarrassment of a back-down. Though a volte-face on the need to back the US presence in Iraq will damage his standing in the short term, Mr Latham is entitled to continue seeking political advantage from his original opposition to the invasion.
More importantly, Mr Latham's failed gamble on testing the boundaries of the alliance again raises questions of its value to Australia. Supporters of the alliance can point to some economic advantages that have resulted from Australia's unfailing support for American military undertakings over the 53 years of the alliance. But on the one occasion when Australia sought to invoke the treaty during the Malayan emergency in 1964, the Americans refused to become involved, and more recently, Australian hints that it would welcome a US presence during East Timor's transition to independence were rebuffed. Given last week's strong indication that the US would not hesitate to downgrade the alliance over what it saw as Australian intransigence, then the public might be entitled to expect a re-examination of ANZUS.
Certainly, Australia's strategic interest would be better served by having a formal, modernised security arrangement with the US that recognises today's geopolitical realities, not those of half a century ago.
Monday, 14 June 2004
A T BARELY 800 words, the ANZUS treaty is hardly a testament to black-letter law. Ratified in 1951, the treaty binds the signatories to recognise that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of them would endanger the peace and safety of the others. It commits them to consult in the event of a threat and, in the event of attack, to meet the common danger in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. Concluded in the shadow of the Korean War, the treaty offered Australian and New Zealand a protection against a possible future threat of Soviet or Chinese aggression. For the US, the pay-off was a secure stake in the Pacific as it sought to strengthen its alliances around the world to contain communism.
The domino theory of communist encroachment might have been consigned to the scrap heap years ago, replaced by a fundamentally changed geopolitical climate, but the alliance continues in all its nebulousness, thanks mainly to the belief of Australian Governments — of both political persuasions — that it is fundamental to national security. While in opposition, the ALP has occasionally questioned aspects of the alliance, but has generally fallen into a supportive line once in government. For the Americans, of course, the alliance is but a minor aspect of its global security considerations, though it has proved useful on occasion (such as the Vietnam and Gulf Wars) for Administrations looking for willing partners to lend their strategic ambitions with a veneer of respectability.
Unusually, ANZUS is of particularly concern of the Administration of George W Bush right now, struggling as it is to maintain the legitimacy of its invasion of Iraq. For Mr Bush, mindful of the potential damage Iraq represents to his chances of re-election in November, having Australian forces on the ground, however small that actual presence, is symbolically important. Hence the chorus of disapproval, beginning first with Mr Bush's own comments earlier this month, of Mark Latham's stated intention of withdrawing Australian troops from Iraq should he win the next election. That these criticisms have become increasingly strident and blunt, as evidenced by the comments of Deputy of State Richard Armitage late last week, indicates the political vulnerability of the Administration, and to a certain extent its willingness to help out Prime Minister John Howard, also in political hot water over his backing of the US-led invasion.
What seemed like a politically astute move at the time by Latham to distance the ALP from the Coalition's enthusiastic backing of the Iraqi invasion now looks to have gone awry. He was probably unwise to commit to bringing home all the troops when leaving a small contingent might have left him room to manoeuvre. Certainly, last Friday's admission that the ALP will now take advice from Foreign Affairs Department security experts on what needs to be done to protect Australia's diplomats indicates Mr Latham has had second thoughts about maintaining a presence that will satisfy American demands for solidarity. A mandate from the UN for the presence of foreign troops in Iraq, which is now looking like a distinct possibility, might save Mr Latham the political embarrassment of a back-down. Though a volte-face on the need to back the US presence in Iraq will damage his standing in the short term, Mr Latham is entitled to continue seeking political advantage from his original opposition to the invasion.
More importantly, Mr Latham's failed gamble on testing the boundaries of the alliance again raises questions of its value to Australia. Supporters of the alliance can point to some economic advantages that have resulted from Australia's unfailing support for American military undertakings over the 53 years of the alliance. But on the one occasion when Australia sought to invoke the treaty during the Malayan emergency in 1964, the Americans refused to become involved, and more recently, Australian hints that it would welcome a US presence during East Timor's transition to independence were rebuffed. Given last week's strong indication that the US would not hesitate to downgrade the alliance over what it saw as Australian intransigence, then the public might be entitled to expect a re-examination of ANZUS.
Certainly, Australia's strategic interest would be better served by having a formal, modernised security arrangement with the US that recognises today's geopolitical realities, not those of half a century ago.
Monday, July 12, 2004
"Failure of Intelligence"
[Inquiries into the "failures of intelligence" which have mired The Coalition of the Willing/Killing/Shilling in Iraq were completed in both the US and UK recently. We await a similar inquiry in Australia]
It is interesting to note the difference between the US and British response to the “failure of intelligence” over the Iraqi invasion.
The CIA told George W what he wanted to hear in order to justify the President’s desire to whack Iraq. However, in the US, the President — and especially THIS President — has a direct line to God, so the CIA is made the patsy and Dubya skates around the pile-up to emerge squeaky-clean.
Most probably MI6 also told the Prime Minister what he wanted to hear, but in Britain even the aristocracy has given up its belief in the Divine Right of Rulers, having had several more centuries than the US to become cynical about the motives of those at the top of the heap. Hence the UK enquiry has resolutely affirmed that ITS intelligence service will not be taking the fall for Tony Blair’s ingenuous bootlicking of his US ally.
The CIA told George W what he wanted to hear in order to justify the President’s desire to whack Iraq. However, in the US, the President — and especially THIS President — has a direct line to God, so the CIA is made the patsy and Dubya skates around the pile-up to emerge squeaky-clean.
Most probably MI6 also told the Prime Minister what he wanted to hear, but in Britain even the aristocracy has given up its belief in the Divine Right of Rulers, having had several more centuries than the US to become cynical about the motives of those at the top of the heap. Hence the UK enquiry has resolutely affirmed that ITS intelligence service will not be taking the fall for Tony Blair’s ingenuous bootlicking of his US ally.
One realizes that Little Johnny [Howard - Australian Prime Minister] (or, if he takes office, Markie Mark [Latham - federal oppsition leader]) will hope to garner a result to any Australian inquiry that is as obsequious as that which George W received. One wonders how either would react to one closer to that with which Tony Blair is burdened.
