Saturday, October 22, 2005
Iran's Next
Are we going to war with Iran?
by Dan Plesch
The Sunday Telegraph warned last weekend that the UN had a last chance to avert war with Iran and, at a meeting in London last week, the US ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, expressed his regret that any failure by the UN security council to deal with Iran would damage the security council's relevance, implying that the US would solve the problem on its own.
Only days before, the foreign secretary, Jack Straw, had dismissed military action as "inconceivable" while both the American president and his secretary of state had insisted war talk was not on the agenda. The UN's International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors have found that Iran has not, so far, broken its commitments under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, although it has concealed activities before.
It appears that the UK and US have decided to raise the stakes in the confrontation with Iran. The two countries persuaded the IAEA board - including India - to overrule its inspectors, declare Iran in breach of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and say that Iran's activities could be examined by the UN Security Council. Critics of this political process point to the fact that India itself has developed nuclear weapons and refused to join the NPT, but has still voted that Iran is acting illegitimately. On the Iranian side there is also much belligerent talk and pop music now proudly speaks of the nuclear contribution to Iranian security.
The timing of the recent allegations about Iranian intervention in Iraq also appears to be significant. Ever since the US refused to control Iraq's borders in April 2003, Iranian backed militia have dominated the south and, with under 10,000 soldiers amongst a population of millions, the British army had little option but to go along. No fuss was made until now. As for the bombings of British soldiers, some sources familiar with the US army engineers report that these supposedly sophisticated devices have been manufactured inside Iraq for many months and do not need to be imported.
But is the war talk for real or is it just sabre rattling? The conventional wisdom is that for both military and political reasons it would be impossible for Israel and the UK/US to attack and that, in any event, after the politically damaging Iraq war, neither Tony Blair nor George Bush would be able to gather political support for another attack.
But in Washington, Tel Aviv and Downing Street, if not the Foreign Office, Iran is regarded as a critical threat. The regime in Tehran continues to demand the destruction of the state of Israel and to support anti-Israeli forces. In what appeared to be coordinated releases of intelligence assessments, Israeli and US intelligence briefed earlier this year that, while Iran was years from a nuclear weapons capability, the technological point of no return was now imminent.
Shortly after the US elections, the vice-president, Dick Cheney, warned that Israel might attack Iran. Israel has the capability to attack Iranian targets with aircraft and long-range cruise missiles launched from submarines, while Iranian air defences are still mostly based on 25-year-old equipment purchased in the time of the Shah. A US attack might be portrayed as a more reasonable option than a renewed Israeli-Islamic confrontation.
The US army and marines are heavily committed in Iraq, but soldiers could be found if the Bush administration were intent on invasion. Donald Rumsfeld has been reorganising the army to increase front-line forces by a third. More importantly, naval and air force firepower has barely been used in Iraq. Just 120 B52 and stealth bombers could target 5,000 points in Iran with satellite-guided bombs in just one mission.
It is for this reason that John Pike of globalsecurity.org thinks that a US attack could come with no warning at all. US action is often portrayed as impossible, not only because of the alleged lack of firepower, but because Iranian facilities are too hard to target. In a strategic logic not lost on Washington, the conclusion then is that if you cannot guarantee to destroy all the alleged weapons, then it must be necessary to remove the regime that wants them, and regime change has been the official policy in Washington for many years.
For political-military planners, precision strikes on a few facilities have drawbacks beyond leaving the regime intact. They allow the regime too many retaliatory options. Certainly, Iran's neighbours in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf who are worried about the growth of Iranian Shia influence in Iraq would want any attack to be decisive. From this logic grows the idea of destroying the political-military infrastructure of the clerical regime and perhaps encouraging separatist Kurdish and Azeri risings in the north-west. Some Washington planners have hopes of the Sunnis of oil-rich Khuzestan breaking away too.
A new war may not be as politically disastrous in Washington as many believe. Scott Ritter, the whistleblowing former UN weapons inspector, points out that few in the Democratic party will stand in the way of the destruction of those who conducted the infamous Tehran embassy siege that ended Jimmy Carter's presidency. Mr Ritter is one of the US analysts, along with Seymour Hersh, who have led the allegations that Washington is going to war with Iran.
For an embattled President Bush, combating the mullahs of Tehran may be a useful means of diverting attention from Iraq and re-establishing control of the Republican party prior to next year's congressional elections. From this perspective, even an escalating conflict would rally the nation behind a war president.
As for the succession to President Bush, Bob Woodward has named Mr. Cheney as a likely candidate, a step that would be easier in a wartime atmosphere. Mr. Cheney would doubtless point out that US military spending, while huge compared to other nations, is at a far lower percentage of gross domestic product than during the Reagan years. With regard to Mr. Blair's position, it would be helpful to know whether he has committed Britain to preventing an Iranian bomb "come what may" as he did with Iraq.
by Dan Plesch
The Sunday Telegraph warned last weekend that the UN had a last chance to avert war with Iran and, at a meeting in London last week, the US ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, expressed his regret that any failure by the UN security council to deal with Iran would damage the security council's relevance, implying that the US would solve the problem on its own.
Only days before, the foreign secretary, Jack Straw, had dismissed military action as "inconceivable" while both the American president and his secretary of state had insisted war talk was not on the agenda. The UN's International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors have found that Iran has not, so far, broken its commitments under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, although it has concealed activities before.
It appears that the UK and US have decided to raise the stakes in the confrontation with Iran. The two countries persuaded the IAEA board - including India - to overrule its inspectors, declare Iran in breach of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and say that Iran's activities could be examined by the UN Security Council. Critics of this political process point to the fact that India itself has developed nuclear weapons and refused to join the NPT, but has still voted that Iran is acting illegitimately. On the Iranian side there is also much belligerent talk and pop music now proudly speaks of the nuclear contribution to Iranian security.
The timing of the recent allegations about Iranian intervention in Iraq also appears to be significant. Ever since the US refused to control Iraq's borders in April 2003, Iranian backed militia have dominated the south and, with under 10,000 soldiers amongst a population of millions, the British army had little option but to go along. No fuss was made until now. As for the bombings of British soldiers, some sources familiar with the US army engineers report that these supposedly sophisticated devices have been manufactured inside Iraq for many months and do not need to be imported.
But is the war talk for real or is it just sabre rattling? The conventional wisdom is that for both military and political reasons it would be impossible for Israel and the UK/US to attack and that, in any event, after the politically damaging Iraq war, neither Tony Blair nor George Bush would be able to gather political support for another attack.
But in Washington, Tel Aviv and Downing Street, if not the Foreign Office, Iran is regarded as a critical threat. The regime in Tehran continues to demand the destruction of the state of Israel and to support anti-Israeli forces. In what appeared to be coordinated releases of intelligence assessments, Israeli and US intelligence briefed earlier this year that, while Iran was years from a nuclear weapons capability, the technological point of no return was now imminent.
Shortly after the US elections, the vice-president, Dick Cheney, warned that Israel might attack Iran. Israel has the capability to attack Iranian targets with aircraft and long-range cruise missiles launched from submarines, while Iranian air defences are still mostly based on 25-year-old equipment purchased in the time of the Shah. A US attack might be portrayed as a more reasonable option than a renewed Israeli-Islamic confrontation.
The US army and marines are heavily committed in Iraq, but soldiers could be found if the Bush administration were intent on invasion. Donald Rumsfeld has been reorganising the army to increase front-line forces by a third. More importantly, naval and air force firepower has barely been used in Iraq. Just 120 B52 and stealth bombers could target 5,000 points in Iran with satellite-guided bombs in just one mission.
It is for this reason that John Pike of globalsecurity.org thinks that a US attack could come with no warning at all. US action is often portrayed as impossible, not only because of the alleged lack of firepower, but because Iranian facilities are too hard to target. In a strategic logic not lost on Washington, the conclusion then is that if you cannot guarantee to destroy all the alleged weapons, then it must be necessary to remove the regime that wants them, and regime change has been the official policy in Washington for many years.
For political-military planners, precision strikes on a few facilities have drawbacks beyond leaving the regime intact. They allow the regime too many retaliatory options. Certainly, Iran's neighbours in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf who are worried about the growth of Iranian Shia influence in Iraq would want any attack to be decisive. From this logic grows the idea of destroying the political-military infrastructure of the clerical regime and perhaps encouraging separatist Kurdish and Azeri risings in the north-west. Some Washington planners have hopes of the Sunnis of oil-rich Khuzestan breaking away too.
A new war may not be as politically disastrous in Washington as many believe. Scott Ritter, the whistleblowing former UN weapons inspector, points out that few in the Democratic party will stand in the way of the destruction of those who conducted the infamous Tehran embassy siege that ended Jimmy Carter's presidency. Mr Ritter is one of the US analysts, along with Seymour Hersh, who have led the allegations that Washington is going to war with Iran.
For an embattled President Bush, combating the mullahs of Tehran may be a useful means of diverting attention from Iraq and re-establishing control of the Republican party prior to next year's congressional elections. From this perspective, even an escalating conflict would rally the nation behind a war president.
As for the succession to President Bush, Bob Woodward has named Mr. Cheney as a likely candidate, a step that would be easier in a wartime atmosphere. Mr. Cheney would doubtless point out that US military spending, while huge compared to other nations, is at a far lower percentage of gross domestic product than during the Reagan years. With regard to Mr. Blair's position, it would be helpful to know whether he has committed Britain to preventing an Iranian bomb "come what may" as he did with Iraq.
Thursday, October 20, 2005
Freedom of Speech and Terrorism
[Australian PM John Howard was preparing to push the Parliament a set of draconian "anti-terrorism" laws and called a meeting of State Premiers to strongarm them into agreement, giving them a 'confidential' copy of the draft legislation. Chief Minister of the Australian Capital Territory, Jon Stanhope, took the unusual and brave step of publishing the draft on his website. Naturally he was subjected to the calumny of all and sundry on the political Right ... but he did have some support, such as this editorial leader in The Canberra Times]
Stanhope acts for free speech
JustinB
Monday, 17 October 2005
ACT Chief Minister Jon Stanhope has done a politically dangerous thing in making public draft legislation supplied to him by the Commonwealth, but he is guilty of no impropriety, and has indeed done the public a service. A service the greater because the Federal Government is engaged in a strategy to severely limit discussion, debate and time for analysis of the legislation, involving the most draconian shift in ordinary balances of human rights since 1939, and, arguably since Australia became a nation in 1901. And all the more so since the Federal Government's reaction to concern or criticism of the legislation consists mostly of saying "trust me", and because most of the Labor state leaders have abdicated any concern about the human rights balances lest they be smeared, as, on the Prime Minister's form, they would be (and Jon Stanhope will be) as "soft on terrorism".
Stanhope risks his "discourtesy" being somehow characterised as giving aid and comfort, or perhaps advance warning, to the terrorist community, or akin to the premature publication of sensitive commercial information or negotiations in process. Such analogies are false. The late working draft of a public law could only be improved by public discussion. But in practice, the Government may use it as an excuse to deprive Mr Stanhope, and thus the public, of other information or details of its plans.
The most worrying aspect of the new draft involves efforts to "update" old sedition laws. Such laws - that protect the state and groups within it from violent attack - are not, of themselves, objectionable, even if they have not been needed for more than 50 years. But they must carefully balance rights to freedom of speech, of freedom of assembly, and of a right to hold, even to propagate, views deeply hostile to a status quo, provided that one takes no active role in putting one's views into effect. In the context of the terror scare, for example, there is, or ought to be, no crime in being sympathetic to Islamist causes, rejecting Western civilisation, or believing that Western military intervention in Muslim countries is foolish or wrong. Holding such views may make you a legitimate person of interest to the security authorities - so that they can reassure themselves that you are not doing anything representing a basic violence to our system, our country, our laws or our men and women engaged in carrying out our Government's will - but should not, of itself, be illegal. Nor indeed should mere demonstration, perhaps even involving loud words or minor disorder, go into the sedition zone and be regarded as unlawfully confronting our system. Our system has, and was designed to have, broad shoulders and considerable scope for political dissent.
The draft makes passing reference to the human rights counter-balances, but, rather than putting them to the fore, makes them matters of defence. Assumption has shifted both towards a prima facie illegality of "disloyal" conduct, and to the serious risk of criminalisation of ideas and thoughts. And it overlooks the very real difference between public dissent and secret and unlawful conspiracy: it is, for example, very easy to imagine that anti-Vietnam or anti-Springbok protesters, those who protested in the streets for Croatian nationalism in the 1960s, or East Timorese nationalism in the 1980s and 1990s would have fallen within the ambit of this law.
Even assuming - with little real evidence advanced - that the actual danger from terrorists and their sympathisers is now so great as to justify detention without trial, movement laws, and compulsory questioning, it is clear that the regime of checks and balances on political abuse of the powers is quite unsatisfactory. Few will have confidence in the good sense, or love of liberty of the Attorney-General, on his record.
There might, perhaps, be more room for confidence in the democratic spirit and professionalism of bureaucrats, were not the powers so lopsided and all of the proposed statutory pressures pushing them towards a "just in case" approach rather than towards restraint. If there is a terrorist incident, after all, there will soon be a witch hunt for those who neglected the warning signs. Likewise, the quasi-judicial warrants regime can scarcely be said to operate as a check and balance, not only because of the scope for finding a panel of tame judicial officers (as police in some jurisdictions attempt), for steam-rollering them with claims of urgency, imminent danger and an implication that the blame will transfer to them, but because of the lack of feedback or supervision of what happens after a warrant is issued. Perhaps, for example, there will be a matter urgent enough for an order to be issued without hearing from the person subject to the order. But, why, from the moment he is apprehended, should he (or his representatives) not be heard over his detention, compulsory questioning, or obligation to change his way of life? That the system, including the inadequate outside scrutiny, is completely behind the veil, the law making it a serious offence for a person under orders to disclose them, and for the media, or anyone else, to report the fact of such orders removes other important parts of the checks and balances process. With or without sunset provisions, it can be assumed that once the state vests itself with such powers, they will never be taken away. And they will become very handy for improper purposes, as, for example, when police and security authorities used such powers to ban dissidents of their choosing from the recent British Labor Party conference.
Alas, given the timidity and lack of ticker of Labor, the arguments about the legislation will occur primarily in public forums, rather than in Parliament. But it should be entirely clear that concerns about the scope and the rationale of the legislation are by no means confined to a ratbag fringe of what some would no doubt call "the usual suspects". Many members of the judiciary are deeply concerned - the views of the ACT Chief Justice, Terry Higgins, would more closely represent those of most judges than the calming, or sneering, words of Philip Ruddock. Likewise with the legal profession, including many of generally conservative persuasion, well aware of how powers given the executive are rarely returned, and how wide is the scope for abuse. And those who ought to be fearful should be anyone who has ever entertained an unpopular view, even one straight out of Western liberal tradition.
JustinB
Monday, 17 October 2005
ACT Chief Minister Jon Stanhope has done a politically dangerous thing in making public draft legislation supplied to him by the Commonwealth, but he is guilty of no impropriety, and has indeed done the public a service. A service the greater because the Federal Government is engaged in a strategy to severely limit discussion, debate and time for analysis of the legislation, involving the most draconian shift in ordinary balances of human rights since 1939, and, arguably since Australia became a nation in 1901. And all the more so since the Federal Government's reaction to concern or criticism of the legislation consists mostly of saying "trust me", and because most of the Labor state leaders have abdicated any concern about the human rights balances lest they be smeared, as, on the Prime Minister's form, they would be (and Jon Stanhope will be) as "soft on terrorism".
Stanhope risks his "discourtesy" being somehow characterised as giving aid and comfort, or perhaps advance warning, to the terrorist community, or akin to the premature publication of sensitive commercial information or negotiations in process. Such analogies are false. The late working draft of a public law could only be improved by public discussion. But in practice, the Government may use it as an excuse to deprive Mr Stanhope, and thus the public, of other information or details of its plans.
The most worrying aspect of the new draft involves efforts to "update" old sedition laws. Such laws - that protect the state and groups within it from violent attack - are not, of themselves, objectionable, even if they have not been needed for more than 50 years. But they must carefully balance rights to freedom of speech, of freedom of assembly, and of a right to hold, even to propagate, views deeply hostile to a status quo, provided that one takes no active role in putting one's views into effect. In the context of the terror scare, for example, there is, or ought to be, no crime in being sympathetic to Islamist causes, rejecting Western civilisation, or believing that Western military intervention in Muslim countries is foolish or wrong. Holding such views may make you a legitimate person of interest to the security authorities - so that they can reassure themselves that you are not doing anything representing a basic violence to our system, our country, our laws or our men and women engaged in carrying out our Government's will - but should not, of itself, be illegal. Nor indeed should mere demonstration, perhaps even involving loud words or minor disorder, go into the sedition zone and be regarded as unlawfully confronting our system. Our system has, and was designed to have, broad shoulders and considerable scope for political dissent.
The draft makes passing reference to the human rights counter-balances, but, rather than putting them to the fore, makes them matters of defence. Assumption has shifted both towards a prima facie illegality of "disloyal" conduct, and to the serious risk of criminalisation of ideas and thoughts. And it overlooks the very real difference between public dissent and secret and unlawful conspiracy: it is, for example, very easy to imagine that anti-Vietnam or anti-Springbok protesters, those who protested in the streets for Croatian nationalism in the 1960s, or East Timorese nationalism in the 1980s and 1990s would have fallen within the ambit of this law.
Even assuming - with little real evidence advanced - that the actual danger from terrorists and their sympathisers is now so great as to justify detention without trial, movement laws, and compulsory questioning, it is clear that the regime of checks and balances on political abuse of the powers is quite unsatisfactory. Few will have confidence in the good sense, or love of liberty of the Attorney-General, on his record.
There might, perhaps, be more room for confidence in the democratic spirit and professionalism of bureaucrats, were not the powers so lopsided and all of the proposed statutory pressures pushing them towards a "just in case" approach rather than towards restraint. If there is a terrorist incident, after all, there will soon be a witch hunt for those who neglected the warning signs. Likewise, the quasi-judicial warrants regime can scarcely be said to operate as a check and balance, not only because of the scope for finding a panel of tame judicial officers (as police in some jurisdictions attempt), for steam-rollering them with claims of urgency, imminent danger and an implication that the blame will transfer to them, but because of the lack of feedback or supervision of what happens after a warrant is issued. Perhaps, for example, there will be a matter urgent enough for an order to be issued without hearing from the person subject to the order. But, why, from the moment he is apprehended, should he (or his representatives) not be heard over his detention, compulsory questioning, or obligation to change his way of life? That the system, including the inadequate outside scrutiny, is completely behind the veil, the law making it a serious offence for a person under orders to disclose them, and for the media, or anyone else, to report the fact of such orders removes other important parts of the checks and balances process. With or without sunset provisions, it can be assumed that once the state vests itself with such powers, they will never be taken away. And they will become very handy for improper purposes, as, for example, when police and security authorities used such powers to ban dissidents of their choosing from the recent British Labor Party conference.
Alas, given the timidity and lack of ticker of Labor, the arguments about the legislation will occur primarily in public forums, rather than in Parliament. But it should be entirely clear that concerns about the scope and the rationale of the legislation are by no means confined to a ratbag fringe of what some would no doubt call "the usual suspects". Many members of the judiciary are deeply concerned - the views of the ACT Chief Justice, Terry Higgins, would more closely represent those of most judges than the calming, or sneering, words of Philip Ruddock. Likewise with the legal profession, including many of generally conservative persuasion, well aware of how powers given the executive are rarely returned, and how wide is the scope for abuse. And those who ought to be fearful should be anyone who has ever entertained an unpopular view, even one straight out of Western liberal tradition.
Monday, October 17, 2005
A Safer Middle East?
Making The Middle East Safe For What?
Leon Hadar
16 October
The Bush administration seems to be drawing the outlines of a strategy to oust Syria's President Bashar Assad and his ruling Ba'ath Party.
Of course, no one is considering an American-led military invasion à la Iraq to achieve "regime change" in Damascus. Instead, neoconservative policymakers and analysts are urging Washington to take advantage of the conclusions of the soon-to-be-issued United Nations report on the assassination of Lebanese former PM Rafik Hariri.
Some experts expect that UN chief investigator Detlev Mehlis will point at several top Syrian officials and accuse them of orchestrating the killing that helped trigger public pressure in Lebanon on Syria to withdraw its troops from that country. The neocons are proposing that when Mehlis issues his report, the Bush administration should take the lead in a diplomatic effort aimed at isolating Assad and forcing him out of power.
Unfortunately, not unlike the grand schemes concocted in Washington to get rid of Saddam and his Ba'ath colleagues and bring freedom to Mesopotamia, the American plans to unseat Assad and his Ba'ath cronies and implant a democracy in the Levant are based mostly on wishful thinking.
It is assumed that the main obstacle to the political and economic renaissance of Syria, Iraq, and the rest of the Middle East is the lack of a viable process to conduct open and free elections. According to the neocons' fantasy, if only the will of the Syrian (or Iraqi, or Egyptian, or Saudi) people could be fully expressed in voting booths, the sky would prove to be the limit for transforming Syria (or Iraq, or Egypt, or Saudi Arabia) into a centre of progress.
If that were the case, one would think that some of the states in the Middle East and North Africa that were freed from imperialism after 1945, adopted Western-style constitutions, and held at one time free elections should now be in the process of applying, like Turkey, for membership in the European Union (EU).
The reason that Iraq, Syria, Egypt, or Algeria have not been able to do the same as Turkey has nothing to do with their failure to hold free elections. In fact, when Algeria was about to complete legislative elections in 1992, the Algerian military, with the support of the French government, moved to cancel the vote that was expected to bring to power anti-Western Islamic political parties.
Ethnicity and Religion
Indeed, as anyone knowledgeable about the Middle East will maintain, open and free elections in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Syria - as opposed to the government-managed voting that takes place from time to time in those countries - would probably bring to power radical Islamic groups whose interests and values, such as those regarding the rights of women and minorities, are antithetical to those of the United States.
The main reason for this is the collapse of the secular Arab nationalist ideology; now the only legitimate sense of identity from which political leaders and movements can draw genuine public support evolves around tribalism, ethnicity, and religion. What has happened in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein demonstrates this proposition: The authoritarian Ba'ath regime that was in the hands of the minority Sunnis lacked any sense of political legitimacy but was able to maintain its power over a mishmash of tribes and ethnic and religious groups only by using brute military force and by promoting an amorphous ideological mix of fascism, communism, and Arab and Iraqi nationalism.
But what has replaced Saddam and the Ba'ath is not a new leadership committed to building the foundation of a viable Iraqi nation-state and securing individual political and economic rights. Instead, Iraq is now ruled by ethnic and religious parties and militias, including those representing clerical Shi'ite groups that would have never been able to win legitimacy in the name of a unified Iraqi nation-state because such an entity has never really existed. Hence the best outcome for Iraq is partition or a low-key civil war.
The possible collapse of Assad and his Ba'athists will probably ignite a similar process of "Iraqization" in Syria. Assad may be less brutal than Saddam, but he is also a member of a minority Shi'ite sect (the Alawites) that has controlled the country by force and by trying to keep alive a moribund pan-Arabist ideology.
As in Iraq, the sources of legitimacy for rising political players in Syria will be religion, that of the dominant Sunni group, and ethnicity, including that of a small Kurdish minority. Radical Muslim groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, will fill the political vacuum created by the possible collapse of the Ba'ath and will try to settle old scores with sworn enemies, the Alawites and the Ba'athists who massacred their members in the past. The bloodbath that could take place in post-Assad Iraq could also spill over into neighbouring Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, and Iraq, increasing the chances for a regional conflagration.
In that context, expect Iran to back its co-religionists in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon against Arab Sunnis who enjoy the support of the Saudis, the Jordanians, and the Egyptians. At the same time, Turkey and Iran will try to suppress Kurdish nationalism, and the United States will be drawn into all this mess and forced to make difficult and costly choices. It's all very depressing, but it reflects the reality of most of the Arab Middle East today. The choice that most of those societies face is not between dictatorship and democracy, but between the status quo and the rise of governments who will derive their legitimacy from reawakened ethnic and religious identities and will end up devastating the current nation-state system there.
Not much of a choice. But let's not pretend that the collapse of the Saddams, Assads, Mubaraks, and Sauds will usher in a new era of enlightened democracy in the region. Let's recognize that the American-led war in Mesopotamia is probably the first step in the "Iraqization" of the Middle East, a process that is bound to harm America's long-term interests.
Leon Hadar
16 October
The Bush administration seems to be drawing the outlines of a strategy to oust Syria's President Bashar Assad and his ruling Ba'ath Party.
Of course, no one is considering an American-led military invasion à la Iraq to achieve "regime change" in Damascus. Instead, neoconservative policymakers and analysts are urging Washington to take advantage of the conclusions of the soon-to-be-issued United Nations report on the assassination of Lebanese former PM Rafik Hariri.
Some experts expect that UN chief investigator Detlev Mehlis will point at several top Syrian officials and accuse them of orchestrating the killing that helped trigger public pressure in Lebanon on Syria to withdraw its troops from that country. The neocons are proposing that when Mehlis issues his report, the Bush administration should take the lead in a diplomatic effort aimed at isolating Assad and forcing him out of power.
Unfortunately, not unlike the grand schemes concocted in Washington to get rid of Saddam and his Ba'ath colleagues and bring freedom to Mesopotamia, the American plans to unseat Assad and his Ba'ath cronies and implant a democracy in the Levant are based mostly on wishful thinking.
It is assumed that the main obstacle to the political and economic renaissance of Syria, Iraq, and the rest of the Middle East is the lack of a viable process to conduct open and free elections. According to the neocons' fantasy, if only the will of the Syrian (or Iraqi, or Egyptian, or Saudi) people could be fully expressed in voting booths, the sky would prove to be the limit for transforming Syria (or Iraq, or Egypt, or Saudi Arabia) into a centre of progress.
If that were the case, one would think that some of the states in the Middle East and North Africa that were freed from imperialism after 1945, adopted Western-style constitutions, and held at one time free elections should now be in the process of applying, like Turkey, for membership in the European Union (EU).
The reason that Iraq, Syria, Egypt, or Algeria have not been able to do the same as Turkey has nothing to do with their failure to hold free elections. In fact, when Algeria was about to complete legislative elections in 1992, the Algerian military, with the support of the French government, moved to cancel the vote that was expected to bring to power anti-Western Islamic political parties.
Ethnicity and Religion
Indeed, as anyone knowledgeable about the Middle East will maintain, open and free elections in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Syria - as opposed to the government-managed voting that takes place from time to time in those countries - would probably bring to power radical Islamic groups whose interests and values, such as those regarding the rights of women and minorities, are antithetical to those of the United States.
The main reason for this is the collapse of the secular Arab nationalist ideology; now the only legitimate sense of identity from which political leaders and movements can draw genuine public support evolves around tribalism, ethnicity, and religion. What has happened in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein demonstrates this proposition: The authoritarian Ba'ath regime that was in the hands of the minority Sunnis lacked any sense of political legitimacy but was able to maintain its power over a mishmash of tribes and ethnic and religious groups only by using brute military force and by promoting an amorphous ideological mix of fascism, communism, and Arab and Iraqi nationalism.
But what has replaced Saddam and the Ba'ath is not a new leadership committed to building the foundation of a viable Iraqi nation-state and securing individual political and economic rights. Instead, Iraq is now ruled by ethnic and religious parties and militias, including those representing clerical Shi'ite groups that would have never been able to win legitimacy in the name of a unified Iraqi nation-state because such an entity has never really existed. Hence the best outcome for Iraq is partition or a low-key civil war.
The possible collapse of Assad and his Ba'athists will probably ignite a similar process of "Iraqization" in Syria. Assad may be less brutal than Saddam, but he is also a member of a minority Shi'ite sect (the Alawites) that has controlled the country by force and by trying to keep alive a moribund pan-Arabist ideology.
As in Iraq, the sources of legitimacy for rising political players in Syria will be religion, that of the dominant Sunni group, and ethnicity, including that of a small Kurdish minority. Radical Muslim groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, will fill the political vacuum created by the possible collapse of the Ba'ath and will try to settle old scores with sworn enemies, the Alawites and the Ba'athists who massacred their members in the past. The bloodbath that could take place in post-Assad Iraq could also spill over into neighbouring Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, and Iraq, increasing the chances for a regional conflagration.
In that context, expect Iran to back its co-religionists in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon against Arab Sunnis who enjoy the support of the Saudis, the Jordanians, and the Egyptians. At the same time, Turkey and Iran will try to suppress Kurdish nationalism, and the United States will be drawn into all this mess and forced to make difficult and costly choices. It's all very depressing, but it reflects the reality of most of the Arab Middle East today. The choice that most of those societies face is not between dictatorship and democracy, but between the status quo and the rise of governments who will derive their legitimacy from reawakened ethnic and religious identities and will end up devastating the current nation-state system there.
Not much of a choice. But let's not pretend that the collapse of the Saddams, Assads, Mubaraks, and Sauds will usher in a new era of enlightened democracy in the region. Let's recognize that the American-led war in Mesopotamia is probably the first step in the "Iraqization" of the Middle East, a process that is bound to harm America's long-term interests.
